Last week, in Union Pacific Railroad Co. & Ezra Alderman Ranches v. Prado, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the liability of a landowner and railroad company when a railroad crossing fatality occurs on private land.

Background

In 2015, Rolando Prado, Jr. died when his pickup was struck by a Union Pacific (UP) train.  The crossing at issue is on private property owned by Ezra Alderman Ranches (the Ranch).  Prado was returning from his first day working at a new jobsite about 7:30 pm.

He was driving at or under the posted 30 MPH speed limit.  He passed through an open ranch gate onto a caliche road that curved toward the railroad tracks.  At the same time, a UP train was headed north on the tracks at about 58 MPH.  The conductor saw Prado’s truck approaching the tracks and blew the train’s horn for 4 seconds about 16 seconds before impact, again from 9 seconds until 4 seconds before impact, and again from 3 seconds before impact until nearly 3 seconds after.

Trees could have blocked Prado’s view of the train until he was about 6 seconds from the crossing, and a fence line could have partially obstructed his view for another second or two, but there was no obstruction during the last six seconds that could have obstructed his view of the tracks or of a sign post immediately before the tracks.  On the sign post was a stop sign and a sign with black crossbucks that read “Private RR Crossing – No Trespassing – Right to Pass by Permission Subject to Control of Owner.”  Everyone agreed that anyone who stops at the stop sign could see a train coming from either direction.  Prado did not stop at the stop sign but continued through the crossing at about 9 MPH and his vehicle was struck by the train, resulting in his death.

Litigation

Prado’s widow, children, and parents sued UP and the Ranch for negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence.  Both defendants moved for summary judgment.  The trial court granted both motions, siding with the defendants and dismissing the case.

The Prados appealed the decision only on their negligence claim.  The San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that fact issues exist as to whether the crossing was “extra-hazardous” or “unreasonably dangerous” and whether the Ranch or Prado had actual knowledge of the crossing’s dangerous condition.

The defendants filed petitions for review, which the Texas Supreme Court granted.

Supreme Court Opinion

The Texas Supreme Court sided with the defendants.  [Read Opinion here.]  The Court addressed each defendant separately as they owe different standards of care.

Union Pacific

The Prados allege that an issue of fact remains as to whether the crossing was extra-hazardous.

Basic law

Generally, a railroad company has a legal duty to “give adequate warning of approaching trains, given whatever obstructions or other conditions exist.”  This includes providing at least one warning sign adequate “to give notice of the proximity of the railroad and warn persons of the necessity of looking out for the cars.”  For ordinary rural railroad crossings, courts have held that a crossbuck sign will typically satisfy this duty. If, however, a crossing is “extra-hazardous,” the duty owed by the railroad company is heightened.  In that circumstance, the railroad must “take extra safety measures to protect those using the crossing.”  Other courts have described this as requiring “extraordinary means” to warn travelers along the road.  These extra measures may include lights or signal bells.

A railroad crossing is deemed extra-hazardous when the plaintiff can prove a prudent person exercising ordinary care cannot safely use the crossing unless extraordinary warnings or protections are provided.  In other words, it must be that ordinary persons cannot safely cross without some warning other than the crossbuck sign. A crossing may be ultrahazardous due to either permanent or temporary conditions, so the categorization of a single crossing could change from time to time depending on circumstances. Factors to consider include visual obstructions like trees and buildings, volume of train and vehicular traffic, angle of the intersection, grade and curvature of the road leading to the crossing, and history of similar accidents at the crossing.

Arguments

The Prados argue this crossing was extra-hazardous based on testimony of two expert witnesses.

The first, an engineer, argued that the signage was insufficient because: (1) the crossbuck sign was not a standard crossbuck and was mounted below the stop sign, not above as required by federal standards; (2) the post did not have a reflective strip as federal standards require; and (3) because of the slight curve in the road as it approaches the track, the signs were not visible enough early enough to permit a reasonable driver time to timely respond.  He noted that federal guidance requires at least 270′ for a driver traveling 30 MPH to react to a warning sign, and these signs were 266′ 10″ from the ranch gate.

The second expert disagreed with much of the first expert’s testimony, admitting that the stop sign was the same size, shape and color as any other and that the visibility of the stop sign was not obstructed at any reasonable distance.  He argued, however, that the stop sign “lacks credibility” because it is “consistently clear to drivers that there’s no need to stop.”  He testified that 98%  of the time there is no train present, so it is “crying wolf” to ask people to stop when they know stopping is practically never necessary. Additionally, he said that the stop sign is never enforced.  This, he argues, means that most people will not come to complete stops.  He made observations at this crossing and found that only 32% of drivers stopped at the sign in one day. Both experts also argued that this crossing has an unusually high number of trains (24/day) and vehicles (50-75/day) and that since it opened in 1977 there have been 3 prior accidents (one fatality).  Of those accidents, only one had involved a vehicle being hit while driving across the crossing.  The other three non-fatal accidents involved trailers stopped on the tracks.

UP argued that there is no factual issue and the crossing is not extra-hazardous as a matter of law.  UP noted that it posted not only the crossbuck sign, but also a stop sign, which would cause a reasonable person to come to a stop and look for trains before crossing the tracks.  UP argued that a railroad crossing cannot be extra-hazardous if it is only hazardous to those who fail to stop at a visible stop sign.

Ruling

The Court held the crossing was not extra-hazardous. Here, not only did the crossing contain the crossbuck sign as required, it also contained an additional warning device in the stop sign.  A crossbuck sign requires drivers to “yield” to any train in hazardous proximity and to stop only if the train is close enough that doing so is required for safety.  Conversely, a stop sign requires approaching drivers to stop regardless of whether safety requires it. Thus, reasoned the Court, a stop sign imposes the same legal requirements on a driver as the “extraordinary” flashing lights that often protect busier crossings.

With regard to Prado’s experts, the Court noted that while the first expert discussed how the sign differed from federal requirements, he did not explain how any of those differences could have prevented a reasonably prudent driver approaching the crossing as Prado did from seeing the signs or understanding he was approaching a railroad crossing and must stop.  The Court also found there was no evidence that a driver could not have seen the signs or the tracks.  Indeed, the record shows the opposite, indicating that there was no obstruction for a driver approaching the tracks that would have prevented seeing the signage or tracks. To the extent he suggests the three foot, two inch difference between the sign placement, the Court rejected this in part of the second expert’s testimony where he admitted the stop sign was not obstructed within any reasonable distance.

With regard to the second expert, the Court stated that although the expert claimed the sign lacked credibility and drivers knew there was no reason to stop, the law requires all drivers to stop at a stop sign, and Texas law presumes drivers will obey the law.  Further, there was no evidence that a reasonably prudent driver could not stop at the stop sign.  Additionally, any argument that Prado could not see the approaching train due to the curve in the road or the trees is negated because he would have seen the train had he stopped at the stop sign as he was legally obligated to do.

Lastly, the Court noted that only 1 prior accident occurred under similar circumstances in the last 40 years at a crossing with relatively high traffic volume is “simply no evidence that reasonably prudent drivers cannot safely traverse the crossing without warnings in addition to the stop sign and crossbuck sign.”

Thus, the crossing was not extra-hazardous as a matter of law.  UP’s stop sign and crossbuck sign were sufficient warnings for an ordinary crossing.  The court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court.  The Court issued judgment in UP’s favor.

The Ranch

The court of appeals held that Prado was a licensee, and no party contested that holding in the Supreme Court.  A licensee is someone who enters the property of another for his or her own benefit.

Basic law

A landowner must “use ordinary care either to warn a licensee of, or to make reasonably safe, a dangerous condition of which the owner is aware and the licensee is not.”

A condition is unreasonably dangerous if there “is a sufficient probability of a harmful event occurring that a reasonably prudent person would have foreseen it or some other similar event as likely to happen.” In determining whether a condition is unreasonably dangerous, courts consider several factors including whether the condition was clearly marked, the size of the condition, whether the condition previously caused injuries or generated complaints, whether it substantially differed from similar conditions, whether it is naturally occurring, and whether it met applicable safety standards.

Arguments

The Ranch argued there is no evidence to support a finding that the crossing is unreasonably dangerous or that the Ranch had actual knowledge that it was.  It claimed it fulfilled its duty as a landowner by posting speed-limit signs, clearing brush to maintain visibility of the track and signs, and ensuring the signs were posted.  This, the Ranch argued, eliminated any unreasonably dangerous conditions and ensured that prudent drivers were fully aware of the risks.

The Prados pointed to their experts’ testimony and the fact that prior accidents had occurred to show that the crossing was unreasonably dangerous.  They pointed to testimony of the Ranch president who said he was aware of a small cross placed near the crossing.  He said a ranch employee told him it was placed there after a previous accident.

Ruling

Even if the Court were to assume the Prados were correct and the crossing was  unreasonably dangerous, there must be evidence that the Ranch actually knew that the crossing was unreasonably dangerous, not just that they should have known.  The admissions by the Ranch president did not give rise to actual knowledge of the prior accident.  The Court said that, at most, it could support a finding that he might have thought something occurred at or near the crossing, but not that he was aware of what occurred prior to Prado’s accident. The Ranch employee only knew there had been a prior fatal accident near the crossing, but not that he had knowledge that it was due to a train-vehicle collision or that he had any knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the accident.  The Ranch is not privy to any sort of reporting mechanism that provides notices of accidents at the crossing.  The Ranch had never seen the accident report from the prior fatality. Thus, there was simply no evidence that the Ranch knew the crossing was unreasonably dangerous and, therefore, the Ranch did not violate the duty it owed to Prado, a licensee.

Conclusion

In light of this, the Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trail court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of UP and the Ranch.

Key Takeaways 

First of all, this case is a good reminder of the importance of always taking care when crossing railroad tracks. This is something many of us who grew up in rural areas are told from a young age, but perhaps a reminder not to overlook the need to carefully approach these crossings is necessary.

Second, this case is also a good reminder that landowners oftentimes find themselves as defendants in a lawsuit.  Here, the landowners prevailed at the Texas Supreme Court, but doing so took years and many hours of attorney time.  This is why it is critical that all landowners carry liability insurance on their property.  Remember, liability insurance requires that the insurer provide a defense to the insured if a claim arises.  That means the insurance company will pay for a lawyer to represent the insured in a covered lawsuit.

Third, remember that landowners owe a duty to warn or make safe any dangerous conditions they actually know of to a licensee.  This is not something that should be overlooked.  If a landowner is to invite someone on his or her property for that person’s own benefit, the landowner should analyze what dangerous conditions they are aware of and ensure they provide warnings or make the condition safe.  Also, keep in mind that a higher duty of care is owed by a landowner to an invitee–that is someone who enters the property for the mutual benefit of the landowner and the invitee.  In that situation, the question is not whether the landowner actually knew of the condition, as was the question in this case, but whether a landowner should have known about it with a reasonable inspection. To read more about landowner liability law in Texas and steps to take to protect an operation, click here (Chapter 5).